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The aim of this paper is to analyze the investments made by Portugal Telecom (PT) in 
the Brazilian telecommunications sector as well as their financial results. There are a 
lot of complex and multifaceted questions underlying such an issue, mainly related to 
the size and characteristics of this particular foreign direct investment operation of a 
Portuguese company. In light of this, we will try to answer to the following points: which 
are the financial results achieved by PT in Brazil through its investments? Which is 
their contribution to the financial health of PT from 1998 to 2009? In our research we 
take into account the perspective of international business theories, particularly at the 
early stages of the internationalization process, and that of theoretical institutionalism 
that gives emphasis to the technical environment, analyzing organizations as efficient if 
they produce goods or services accepted by the market and, consequently, reach their 
goals. From a company's financial results it can be deduced whether or not the 
strategy and objectives defined are consistent with the prospect of success and 
recognition, in line with the arguments developed by Scott (1991, 1992 and 2008). The 
main part of the paper is thus concentrated in the analysis of the financial results of PT 
through several indicators regarding investments, revenues, returns and other related 
aspects. The study allows the conclusion that despite the hard and complex life of PT 
in Brazil from 1998 to 2009, positive financial results were obtained and the strategy 
and objectives defined in the beginning of the process had favorable conditions to be 
successful. 
 







By the second half of the 1990s, there was a major wave of Portuguese 
investments in Brazil (Silva, 2005). Increasing macroeconomic stabilization in 
this country (a consequence of Plano Real in 1994), the implementation of a 
vast program of privatization, and the consolidation of the openness and 
liberalization processes, started in the late 1980s, favored the attraction of 
foreign capitals. The acquisition of Telesp Celular by Portugal Telecom (PT) in 
July 29, 1998, was by far the greatest Portuguese investment abroad up to now, 
and its analysis became highly interesting, particularly as regards the 
Portuguese internationalization through outward FDI. The fact that PT, although 
with its own privatization in progress, depended strongly on public decisions, 
initially by ownership, and later through a “golden share”, gave a hot political 
sensitivity to this investment. Moreover, this wave of Portuguese outward FDI 
was criticized as being “premature”, and this investment of PT in Brazil in 
particular was objected in supposedly technical bases such as the argument 
that PT was benefiting in the domestic market of a public monopoly in an infra-
structural sector, and so possibly transferring revenues to Brazil to the detriment 
of Portuguese consumers (Mateus 2006, pp. 313-4). 
 
Beyond the previous remarks, this process must be put in a broader context. 
Indeed, frequent shifts of government in Portugal, without a clear and shared 
internationalization strategy (Silva 2006, 2008), considerably weakened PT 
position, for example inducing quite often changes in its executive leadership. 
Moreover, many other factors had a significant impact on the course of this 
investment. In first years of PT’s presence in Brazil, for example, the turbulence 
in the exchange and financial areas (from the adoption of a flexible exchange 
rate for the real in January 1999 to the financial turmoil that accompanied the 
passage of the presidency from Fernando Henrique Cardoso to Luiz Inácio Lula 
da Silva in 2002/2003, etc.), and the aftermath of the dotcom bubble collapse in 
2000 that deeply changed the financial conditions where telecommunications’ 
firms were operating, must be seriously taken into account in the interpretation 
of this investment and its results. Due to these and other circumstances, the 
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position of PT in Brazil became an easy target not only for competitors, but also 
for investors seeking quick cash benefits. Meanwhile, there were moving 
alliances, but the main case was the creation of VIVO (2003), a joint-venture 
equally shared by Portugal Telecom and Telefónica Móviles of Spain that 
grouped the assets of both companies in Brazil; thus, on a basis 50%-50% 
which of course engendered management problems like uncertainty and other 
difficulties arising from conflicting interests. There were also two main takeover 
bids in 2006 and 2010; the former for the entire group (launched by 
SONAECOM), but where the presence of PT in Brazil was at stake, and the 
latter launched by Telefónica aiming specifically at the ownership of all VIVO 
which was successful. In 2011, PT is still in Brazil, but in very different 
conditions from those that existed after July 1998, as an associate of OI, thus in 
minority position. 
 
This exploratory paper is part of a broader study of the experience of PT in 
Brazil from 1998 to 2009. In spite of their importance to understand the 
institutional environment of this case, most of the questions that have just been 
raised will not be examined in detail here, rather we will focus on investments, 
financial performance and returns of PT after the acquisition of Telesp Celular; 
PT also made other investments in the Brazilian telecommunications sector 
throughout that period, but due to its importance and implications, we will center 
our analysis in this one. Within the context of the whole research project, 
another study has already been published concerning the impact of the 
internationalization of PT on its organizational structure (Fonseca et al., 2009). 
The interest of investment returns and financial performance of PT in Brazil is 
obvious, particularly when there are doubts about the good reason of such an 
investment. From the statistical point of view, our research will be essentially 
based on the data provided by the consolidated financial statements, annually 
published in the Report and Consolidated Accounts of Portugal Telecom. 
 
After this introduction, the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the 
theoretical background of PT investments in Brazil, refers to the contribution of 
international business theories and to the institutionalism’s approach to the 
subject, and raises the main questions to be analyzed. In Section 3, we 
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describe the institutional context of PT’s internationalization focusing on the 
home country as well in the main host country (Brazil). Section 4 examines the 
core subjects of the paper: the investments and financial results consequent to 
the internationalization of the company, and the major role played by Brazil in 
this process: some specific aspects will be taken into account such as the 
weight of this country in the consolidated operating revenues by segment of 
business and geographical area, and in the number of clients. In the final, 
Section 5, we draw some remarks highlighting the main empirical findings and 
the arguments developed in this work. 
 
 
2. Theoretical background 
In the early 1990s, Portuguese firms had no significant experience of 
internationalization. However, with the structural changes induced by the 
Portuguese membership of EU, among other factors, the increasing competition 
in the domestic market they had necessarily to develop their competitive edge 
in the international market. One of the main aspects of this process was the 
deepening of the relation of Portuguese economy with FDI inward and outward 
flows (Silva 2006). In the case of outward FDI flows we may say that they only 
began at a reasonable scale in the middle of the 1990s; the previous 
experience was disperse and generally involving small amounts. Moreover, 
throughout the following decade of 2000, Portuguese outward FDI flows 
remained globally positive but at a decreasing rate (Júlio & Alves 2011, p. 63). 
Also, as in the case of Spain (Toral 2006), Portuguese firms initially invested 
more in regions and countries where they had cultural and linguistic proximity. 
Due to changes occurred in the 1990s, and developed hereafter, the conditions 
were particularly favorable in Brazil, and Portuguese firms significantly took that 
path which has been analyzed in terms of international business theories such 
as the Nordic School and the OLI Paradigm (Silva 2005). 
 
The exploration of this issue from an international business perspective 
converged in our case with institutional theory concerns. Indeed, the entire 
project behind this paper is deeply embedded in the theory of institutionalism, 
so, it is important to highlight some of its underlying points. Theorists within this 
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approach, have stressed the importance of relations between the organization 
and the environment, considering the culture and the influence on it, in so far 
the organizations (like firms) are seen by the institutional theory as having two 
essential dimensions: technical and institutional. The technical dimension is 
guided by the norms of rationality and efficiency, while the institutional 
dimension is controlled by the expectations of the external environment. The 
cognitive and cultural issues came to be analyzed as powerful aspects of 
economic, social and cultural settings of the organizational environment. 
According to Scott (1992, p. 157), the emphasis of the analysis shifted from "the 
technical facets to the institutional facets of the environments.”  
 
It is important to highlight the difference between institutional environment and 
technical environment, involving different meanings of rationality (Scott 1992). 
The technical environment controls the products generated by the 
organizations, the place where the exchange of the services or products takes 
place is the market, considering that the return is dependent on the efficiency 
and effectiveness whereby the process is given. The institutional environment is 
elaborated by rules and requirements to which the organization adapts to gain 
legitimacy and support of the environment. The institutionalist approach extends 
the vision incorporating environmental flows and technical exchanges into a 
system of institutionalized norms and beliefs. 
 
The technical environment is defined by Scott (1992, p. 158) as the area in 
which "a product or service is exchanged in the market and organizations are 
rewarded for efficient and effective control of the work process." In this sense, 
the technical environment exerts control over the products generated by the 
organizations. Also, the institutional environment is characterized by "elaborate 
rules and institutional scripts to which organizations must conform to achieve 
support and legitimacy of the environment" (Scott 1992, p. 157). Thus, we can 
distinguish from the control exerted by the technical environment and the 
control exerted by the institutional environment. This control occurs on the 
organizational structures and processes of the work when determining the 
procedures to be used, the qualifications of its personnel and the types of skills 
that can be employed. Thus, different rationalities can be identified among the 
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technical and institutional environments. On the one hand, the "rational" in 
technical environments is what allows organizations to be efficient and to 
produce goods or services accepted by the market thereby reaching their goals. 
On the other hand, “rationality” in institutional environments is found in the 
procedures, standards and rules capable of providing legitimacy for the 
organizational present and future. 
 
Thus, the technical factors that analyze the efficiency of an organization are 
seriously considered and therefore the analysis of the financial results of a 
company, in our case of PT, can show whether or not the strategy and 
objectives defined are consistent with the prospect of success and recognition. 
The questioning of this subject is obtained through the following question: which 
are the financial results achieved by PT from the investments made in Brazil? 
As explained later, it is assumed that the answer to this question presupposes 
that the financial results obtained by the PT in Brazil have a great weight in the 
total of its performance.  
 
 
3. The institutional context of Portugal Telecom’s internationalization 
The internationalization process of PT was presented as a key component of its 
strategy in 1997 in order to achieve growth and face the challenges of a new 
era of quick and profound changes. This strategy was clearly expressed in the 
following terms: 
 
International operations will play an increasing role in the development 
of the Group, enhanced by the agreements of strategic alliance, and 
seeking in the next few years to put into effect major investments, 
especially in Latin America, particularly Brazil, and Africa, in areas of 
the Maghreb and Portuguese-speaking countries. (PORTUGAL 
TELECOM, Report and Consolidated Accounts, 1997, p. 22). 
 
This strategy meets the cooperation agreements established with strategic 
partners, in particular the acquisition of 1% of the shares of Telefónica and the 
participation in system-wide basis and, as referred to above, turned into reality 
in 1998 with investments in the Brazilian telecommunications market with the 
acquisition of major holdings in Telesp Celular and Telesp Fixed CRT - 
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Riograndense Telecommunications Company, which had very favorable 
conditions to grow. With these acquisitions, PT implemented its strategy for 
entering into new markets with strong growth potential in countries where the 
company had important advantages, due to linguistic and cultural ties, and of 
course, knowledge of business. These factors have been determinants in the 
internationalization process of PT. Despite the prioritization of the Brazilian 
market, the PT Group reached a much wider international presence, with 
investments in the following countries: Hungary, East Timor, Macao, 
Mozambique, Kenya, Angola, Namibia, São Tomé and Príncipe, Cape Verde 
and Morocco. 
 
If we look at the bases of the strategy of internationalization implemented by 
PT, it must be noted that: 
 
The whole essence of the strategic vision in management can be 
summarized in the idea of building at the organizational level, a 
position that is strong enough to clearly indicate a future direction and 
flexible enough to be changed according to new environmental 
conditions. (Motta 2001, p. 92) 
 
The clear indication of “a future direction”, as emphasized long ago by Edith 
Penrose, is based on “expectations” not “objective facts”, insofar for this author: 
 
‘Expectations’, and not “objective facts”, are the immediate 
determinant factors of the behavior of a firm, although there may be 
some relationship between expectations and the “facts”. Effectively, 
there must be some, if the activity intends to be successful, since the 
success of plans of a firm in part depends on their implementation, 
and on whether they are based or not on reasonable judgments about 
the possibility of successful activities. (2006, p. 85) 
 
In order to analyze the internationalization process of PT towards Brazil, it is 
necessary to historically contextualize the pull factors of the PT Group. 
According to Charlton et al. (2003), some reasons can be identified as a 
stimulus for attracting foreign direct investment to Brazil in the late 1990s: 
 
 The distributional impact of the Plano Real in favor of the lower classes 
of the population, which can be analyzed through sector and regional 
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dimensions: growth in demand for durable and nondurable consumer 
goods, has been particularly strong for the lower income layers, as much 
as for the middle class, demand growth in poorer regions has been 
higher than the national average – all this increased the potential 
demand in the markets of these goods. 
 The consolidation of the MERCOSUR regional integration process which 
provided regulatory reforms for the liberalization of trade, investment and 
domestic competition. 
 Trade liberalization and regulatory reform combined with competition 
among sub-national levels of government (tax competition) to attract 
investment has provided two types of effects on the location and 
relocation of production in Brazil. One effect involves a process of 
industrial decentralization, which was formerly concentrated in São 
Paulo, in favor of other places in South and Southeast regions. The other 
effect has been the relocation of some production from the South and 
Southeast to places in the North, Northeast and Central West regions. 
 
The opening process of the Brazilian economy (started in the late 1980s) had 
led the productive sector to adjustments because of increasing competition, 
either caused by lower trade barriers, or by reducing aggregate domestic 
demand. Significant adjustment efforts were undertaken by large segments of 
the manufacturing sector in order to become more competitive by reducing 
costs and improving the quality of its products - despite the recessionary and 
inflationary context of that period, which tended to discourage investment, and 
the absence of an industrial policy to support such adjustment changes. 
 
Later, in the middle of the 1990s, there were favorable conditions for a massive 
inflow of FDI in Brazil. Indeed, as we have just emphasized, the distributional 
impact of Plano Real, the consolidation of the MERCOSUR and the trade 
liberalization of Brazilian economy, created the institutional conditions 
necessary to attract foreign investments to the country. Another stimulus came 
from the Brazilian privatization process, which took place in a historical context 
of wide international liberalization; in so far since the 1980s there was strong 
incentives (political, economic, and ideological) for the state to divest from state-
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owned companies. The privatization through the transfer of property (from 
public to private entities) was characteristically an example that showed the 
shrinking of the state's role in managing the economy and the activities related 
to economic development for the benefit of civil society and private enterprises. 
In this sense, privatization led to some reduction in the sphere of state functions 
and in its nature. 
 
Also, in parallel with all these processes, the Luso-Brazilian economic relations 
after decades of stagnation and poor performance started to increase again. 
Since the early 1990s this trend became obvious (Silva 2002), and the 
Portuguese investments after 1995 was undoubtedly the major example of this 
new course: 
 
Indeed, between 1995 and 2002, Brazil is always found in the three 
top places of destination of Portuguese outward FDI (in general, 
switching positions with Spain and the Netherlands), (...). On the other 
hand, in 2002, we identified approximately 370 Portuguese 
subsidiaries interacting in the Brazilian business sector (in very varied 
areas, ranging from infrastructure such as energy and cement, 
through the agro-food, to the new information technologies and 
tourism). (Silva 2003, p. 24). 
 
If, in the beginning of the 1990s, only a few Portuguese companies had 
invested in Brazil, in the middle of first decade of the new century, several 
hundreds of those firms were well rooted in the Brazilian market, and a large 
number of them had in fact become Luso-Brazilian by the size of their business 
(ICEP 2005).  
 
In this context, it must be emphasized the process of privatization of the 
Brazilian1 telecommunications industry that occurred under the government of 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso, with the approval in February 1995 of the 
Concessions Law - which aimed to establish general rules by which the 
government concede others the right to exploit the "production" of public 
                                                          
1
 The privatization process in Brazil can be identified through four phases: a) that occurred over 
the years 1980, b) which was from 1990 to 1995, c) that occurred between 1995 and 2002, and 
d) the which began in 2007. For the purposes of this article we analyze the privatization of the 
Brazilian telecommunications sector at the stage c. To understand the stages of the Brazilian 
privatization process, see Fonseca & Silva (2011). 
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services, such as power generation and telecommunications services. The 
privatization of these sectors required an adequate regulatory regime, aiming at 
greater competition in the industry, therefore eliminating the public monopolies. 
This process began in the electricity sector with the sale of two power 
distribution companies owned by the federal government, belonging to the 
holding company Eletrobrás: Escelsa and Light. After that the government 
attempted to sell the four generators of the same Eletrobrás: Furnas, Eletrosul, 
Eletronorte and São Francisco Hydroelectric Company (CHESF). 
 
In the telecommunications sector analyzed here, the process began with the 
sale of concessions called "Band B" mobile cellular, described in media terms 
as "the sale of wind," due to the fact of being auctioned an asset but not the 
right to compete with public companies already operating with the mobile 
phone. It is important to notice that in the Brazilian privatization process, the 
crucial moment for the purpose of this work was the sale of public assets of the 
telecommunications sector like TELESP Celular, which led to the entrance of 
the Portuguese capital at a large scale, and in particular PT's investment in the 
Brazilian mobile telephony sector in 1998. 
 
The further consolidation of investments of PT in Brazil necessarily involves the 
positive performance of the Brazilian economy, which enabled the PT to 
achieve good financial results during the period under study as analyzed in the 
following sections. From this point of view, the recent history of Brazilian 
economy will be presented below (see Amitrano, 2010). Between 2001 and 
2010, the average annual growth was 3.6% higher than that recorded in the 
previous decade (1991-2000), when the GDP at market prices increased on 
average 2.6%. In 2010, the Brazilian GDP per capita reached U.S. $ 19,016.00, 
6.5% over 2009. In the decade ended in 2010, GDP per capita recorded 
average annual growth of 2.4%, above the average of 1990’s years when it 
annually only grew 1.1% on average. More recently, the Brazilian economy was 
not seriously affected by the international financial crisis, begun in 2007 and 
aggravated in 2008; moreover, according to IBGE, in 2010, Brazilian GDP was 
7.5% over 2009 (growth rate around zero in this year of generalized 
depression), the highest since 1986 (also 7.5%). According to Amitrano (2010, 
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p. 60), using data from IPEADATA, the growth rate of the Brazilian economy 
has gradually increased over the last decade from 2.5% between 1995 and 
1998, to 2.1% between 1999 and 2002, 3.5% between 2003 and 2006 and 
3.6% between 2007 and 2009. 
 
We want to highlight here the effects of this steady growth of GDP over 
household consumption. It appears that between 1999 and 2002 household 
consumption grew 1.7% on average, in the following period from 2003 to 2006 
its growth was 3.2%, between 2007 and 2008 the growth rate of this component 
of aggregate demand was 6.7%, and during the global crisis in 2009 household 
consumption grew 4.1% (Amitrano 2010, p. 63). Income transfer programs 
implemented by Lula government (2003-2010) played an important role in this 
process; it is the case of Bolsa-Família Program which enabled the expansion 
of available resources to households, particularly low-income families, which 
have a high propensity to consume. In the same period there were also 
substantial increases in the real minimum wage (Amitrano 2010). 
 
But, what we want to point out here is that such a favorable evolution in the 
income of vast layers of the population helped to increase demand for 
consumer durables and more sophisticated services, such as those related to 
telecommunications like mobile phones and others. 
 
 
4. Investments and financial results of Portugal Telecom: a global view 
This section of the paper is basically dedicated to the empirical analysis of 
investments and financial performance (revenues and returns) of PT in the 
global perspective but always trying to clearly identify the part of Brazil in the 
internationalization process of the company. This is an essential step for a 
balanced judgment of these investments, particularly if we take into account the 
complex environment of PT operations during the period under analysis. As 
emphasized in the theoretical section, financial results are also of fundamental 
importance to analyze the interaction of the firm with the environment from the 





4.1 The investments of Portugal Telecom in 1998-2009 and their phases 
Table 1 shows the Financial Investment and the Tangible and Intangible 
Investments (CAPEX), components of Total Investment of PT, from 1998 to 
2009. We can identify three phases: the first covers the years 1998 to 2001, 
and was characterized by large investments of PT in Brazil; the second, from 
2002 to 2007, is marked by a slowdown of investments in Brazil, the 
accommodation of the CAPEX level and the increase in shareholder 
remuneration of PT; and the third includes the years of 2008 and 2009, 
although it maintains the same characteristics of the previous phase regarding 
investments of PT in Brazil as the returns to shareholders, it is distinguished by 
the increase of investment in the information society and R&D. 
 
The first phase, beginning in 1998, evidenced the changes in the level of these 
investments with the inception of the internationalization process of PT in a 
broad scale, reflecting in particular the investments in Brazil, and lasts until 
2001, when the investments related to the successive increases in the holding 
Group's share in Telesp Celular Participacões SA (TCP) were significant. As 
referred to earlier, the largest investment made by PT in Brazil occurred in 1998 
when the auction for the privatization of Telebrás System took place; as a result 
PT secured a controlling stake in Telesp Celular SA (TC), by acquiring 51.8% of 
shares entitled to vote - representing 19.3% of the total capital of the holding 
Telesp Celular Participacões SA (TCP), which was holding 87.3% of common 
shares, representing 71.4% of the total capital of Telesp Celular SA, the 
operator of mobile phone in the state of São Paulo. This participation, which 
included the acquisition by 205.9 million euros in February 2001 of Global 
Telecom2 plus a further consolidation process of increasing the capital of Telesp 
Celular Participações, which can be represented by a change from 19.3% in 
1998 to 65.12 %, in 2002, in the total capital of the holding TCP owned by PT. 
 
                                                          
2
 Global Telecom was the operator who held the concession for the exploitation of mobile 
telephony in the band B, defined by the National Telecommunications Agency (ANATEL) as a 
"mirror" operator, i.e., which had a concession of operation in the band B, aiming at the creation 
of a company to provide the competition in the telephony market with the existing operators who 
work in band A; Global Telecom operated in the states of Paraná and Santa Catarina. 
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Year Financial    D % CAPEX 
(4) (5)








1998 1,128 450 2,599 290 3,724 328
1999 537 -52 1,001 -61 1,537 -59
2000 2,317 331 1,347 35 3,665 138
2001 2,521 9 1,316 -2 3,837 5
2002 329 -87 776 -41 1,105 -71
2003 464 41 652 -16 1,116 1
2004 279 -40 761 17 1,040 -7
2005 18 -94 943 24 961 -8
2006 108 500 868 -8 976 2
2007 - - 899 4 899 -8
2008 517 - 1,242 38 1,759 96




Source : Consolidated Reports of Portugal Telecom, SGPS, S.A.
(1)
 The conversion rate used Euro/Escudo for the years 1997 and 1998 is the rate of 31/12/1998, 
      
in other words, 1 euro/200.482 escudos.
(2)
 Included is the year 1997 as benchmark. Values ??calculated for the year 1997.
(3)
 Value calculated for the years 2003.
(4)
 Value calculated for the years 1998 and 1999.
(5)
 CAPEX for 2002 exclude the acquisition of the basic network made ??by PT Comunicações
     
worth 348 million euros.
(6)
 Value calculated for the years 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2008.
(7)
 Total accumulated.
Table 1: Portugal Telecom - Investments
1998 - 2009




In this period, the CAPEX was very high because, in addition to the investments 
made in Portugal, PT made major investments in the capacity expansion of the 
digital network of Telesp Celular and in the expansion of the infrastructure and 
distribution network of Global Telecom. Hence, PT fulfilled its obligations during 
the process of privatization of Brazilian telecommunications, which set targets 
for universal service and quality of care. 
 
The first phase ends in 2001. In 2002 there is a clear downturn in financial 
investment and CAPEX (Table 1). This slowdown is reflected in a decline of 
71% of the total investment which is in consonance with the policy defined by 
PT in 2001, in order to increase the flow (EBITDA less CAPEX) and to 
maximize the cash flow3 to cope with new investments in Brazil, with resources 
                                                          
3
 The difference between cash inflows and cash outflows for a given period. 
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of Telesp Celular Participacões itself, through reinvestment of profits in local 
currency, without any need for investment coming from the home basis of PT. 
 
The significant reduction in financial investment in Telesp Celular Participacões 
occurred in 2002 not only was in line with the strategy of maximizing cash flow, 
preparing the environment for new acquisitions without the need for new 
investment by controlling PT, but also, for the closing of the deal with Telefónica 
of Spain seeking to create VIVO through BRASILCEL, holding that joined the 
mobile assets of both companies in Brazil. The slowdown of investments was 
also in line with the objective of PT, in its Annual Report for 2002, of reinforcing 
the commitment to improve the return of investments in Brazil. Indeed, the new 
strategy of PT adopted in the second phase was explained in the message to 
shareholders as follows: 
 
Our commitment to improve the return of our investments in Brazil is 
strengthened with the formal launching of Brasilcel, the joint venture 
with Telefónica for mobile telecommunications business in Brazil, 50% 
held by each of the groups. Brasilcel is the largest mobile operator in 
Latin America and has about three times the customers of the second 
operator in Brazil. Brasilcel is therefore extremely well positioned to 
increase customer loyalty and take advantage of synergies stemming 
from their size, thus improving their margins and cash flow. (Annual 
Report 2002, p. 8) 
 
The second phase, whose beginning dates from 2002, was extended until 2007. 
This phase was marked by negative growth rates of the financial investment, 
reflecting accommodation and consolidation of acquisitions of assets held in 
Brazil by VIVO, and businesses in Africa, without major new investments in 
euros. In 2006, PT has invested 143 million euros, of which, 108 million were 
used in the acquisition of MTC4, operator of mobile business in Namibia. Also, 
between the years from 2002 to 2007, CAPEX fluctuates around relatively low 
levels (with the minimum of 652 million Euros in 2003 to 943 million in 2005), 
showing that investments in infrastructure and new network technologies were 
in tune with the growth and potential of the new markets, and of course, with its 
                                                                                                                                                                          
 
4
 Mobile Telecommunications Limited (MTC). 
15 
 
position in these markets in order to cope with fierce competition coming from 
other telecommunications operators. 
 
In relation to the compensation of PT’s shareholders, the progressive and 
sustained increase only appears as a clear objective of PT since 2002, when 
the financial investment reduces 87% and the CAPEX 41%. Thus, in terms of 
shareholder returns, PT distributed about two billion euros between the years 
2003 to 2005. Only in 2005, 648 million Euros were distributed through the 
share buyback5 and dividends. Considering the amount proposed for 2005, the 
dividend paid was roughly quintupled since 2002. Despite the Portuguese 
adverse economic conditions after 2002, including the negative effects of the 
takeover bid launched by SONAECOM launched in February 2006, in a process 
that lasted more than a year, PT has obtained successively favorable results 
with financial and operating performance, which is reflected in the good 
remuneration paid to its shareholders. Moreover, as a result of the action of 
SONAECOM the process of progressive and sustained returns to the PT’s 
shareholders was deepened. 
 
Therefore, the main feature of the second phase was the reduction of PT 
investments associated with the progressive and sustained increase in the 
compensation to the PT’s shareholders, and this trend was maintained even in 
the following phase. According to the message of the Chairman of the Board of 
Directors, PT has paid its shareholders from March 2007 to April 2009, 5.8 
billion euros through dividends, purchase of own shares and the spin-off6 of PT 
Multimedia (Consolidated Annual Report 2009, p. 9). As can also be observed 
in Table 1, in 2007 and 2009, the financial investments are zero, and so total 
investment equals the component of the CAPEX.  
 
In the third phase, covering the years 2008 and 2009, the tangible and 
intangible investments of PT seek not only to respond to the vegetative growth 
of the markets where PT operates, but they also mean to invest in the 
                                                          
5
 Repurchase program of own shares of Portugal Telecom. 
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information society and R&D, with the most significant values ever. Thus, since 
2008, the CAPEX of PT beyond being responsible for its investments in the 
development of 3G and 3.5G networks in Portugal, by increases in the network 
capacity and expansion of 2G network coverage in 3G and 3.5G in Brazil, 
began to contribute and invest more substantially in the information society in 
Portugal. In 2009, 170 million euros were invested, equivalent to 2.5% of 
operating results in the information society in Portugal, and in R&D 233 million 
euros, an increase of 42% over the previous year. 
 
In April 2008, PT, through VIVO, invested 517 million euros in the acquisition of 
Telemig Celular Participações; Telemig Celular was the owner of the operator 
of cellular mobile service in the state of Minas Gerais, with the control over 
more than four million customers, in the third richest state of Brazil. With the 
acquisition of 1.9 GHz licenses in the regions where VIVO did not operate, 
conducted in August 2007, VIVO secured its entry in the Northeast region and 
increased its coverage throughout the country. With these new investments, 
VIVO sought to maintain its leadership position in the Brazilian mobile market, 
which is also one of the strategies of the PT Group in all markets where it 
operates. Indeed, in 2009, VIVO led the Brazilian mobile market with a market 
share of 29.7%. 
 
Also in 2008, in the domestic market, PT strengthened its leadership with the 
success of three major programs planned for that year: the launching of meo7, 
the TV of the future, the quest for leadership of the mobile broadband service 
and the investment in the segment of Small and Medium sized Enterprises 
through innovative and convergent offers. Thus, the CAPEX for 2008, 
amounting to 1,242 million euros was invested in both next-generation 
technologies, and investments associated to customers due to strong growth in 
the television business in Portugal. 
 
As can also be seen in Table 1, the first phase, from 1998 to 2001, despite the 
fall of 1999, year of the sharp devaluation of the real (largely due to 
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overshooting), financial investments made in acquisitions and consolidation of 
mobile assets in Brazil, including the payment of the debt consequent to the 
auction of Telebrás privatization, along with the highest CAPEX in this period, 
determined the total investment to quite significant levels. 
 
The evolution of PT Group's investments, between 1998 and 2009, are strongly 
influenced by investments of its holding company Telesp Celular Participacoes 
in 1998-2001, in so far the largest PT investments in foreign markets were held 
in Brazil through the acquisition of Telesp Celular. Thus, if the need for 
commitment to improve the return of TCP is deduced, which was carried out 
since 2002, we may conclude that since then the financial health of the PT was 
closely linked to the results of Telesp Celular Participacões and to the future of 
the Brazilian telecommunications market. 
 
After 2002, considering the strong slowdown of the component in financial 
investment, the total investment is to be determined almost exclusively by the 
level of CAPEX – except in the year 2008 with the acquisition of Telemig 
Celular - demonstrating the maturity and the seeking for returns of the 
investments made earlier. So as can be noticed, the level of CAPEX only 
changes in 2008, raising 343 million euros in comparison to the previous year, 
and remains at this new level, with an increase of 2% in 2009, characterizing 
the third phase of investment in PT. 
 
 
4.2 Operating revenues and financial results of Portugal Telecom 
With the purpose of knowing whether or not the strategy of internationalization 
implemented by PT was the right decision, it is crucial to analyze its financial 
results. Bearing this objective in mind we will analyze here the main financial 
indicators of PT in the period under study. In Table 2, some of the main financial 
indicators from 1998 to 2009 are shown: the Consolidated Operating Revenues, 
the EBITDA8 (Operating Results + Reform benefit costs + amortization), the 
Operating Results and the Consolidated Net Income of PT. In all cases the 
annual changes have been calculated.  
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With regard to the Consolidated Operating Revenues are concerned, it can be 
observed that, despite the negative changes for 2002 and 2006, there was 
sustained growth during the period. If we look more closely at the data, we 
realize that their development reveals two phases: the first between 1998 and 
2001, when revenues grew giddy, with an increase of 91.5% during this 
relatively short period, thus almost doubling their level, reflecting the returns of 
large investments; the second phase, from 2003 to 2009, after a small drop in 
revenues in 2002, is characterized by more modest growth rates, but steady, 
despite all the adverse conditions faced this time domestically in the Portuguese 
economy, including the uncertainties around the takeover bid of SONAECOM, 
between the years 2006 and 2007, which had strong impact on the consolidated 
results. 
 
In the evolution of this indicator after 2001, some facts must be highlighted as 
the reversal of financial perspectives of the telecommunications sector after the 
collapse of the dotcom bubble in 2000. The performance of the Brazilian 
economy since 2001 must also be taken into account: a recession once again 
involved external issues, such as the Argentinean crisis, the events regarding 
the attacks of September 11 added to the energy crisis in Brazil in early 2001, 
and, as already referred to above, the resulting devaluation of the real, and the 
financial instability due to uncertainties caused by the Brazilian electoral 
environment in 2002 (and to a lesser extent in 2006). 
 
Regardless of devaluations during this period (it also occurred for some time in 
2008 after the collapse of Lehman Brothers), if we consider that the operating 
revenues of PT grew 32% between 2000 and 2009, it must be noted that the 
Group performed well, very much due to the resumption of economic growth in 
Brazil, from 2004 onward (except in 2009), rather than to the performance of the 
Portuguese economy, that according to Eurostat had an average GDP growth 




                          In millions of euros 
(1)
Year Consolidated    D % EBITDA 
(3)
   D % Operating  Consolidated    D %




2,741 1,166 599 350
1998 2,990 9.1 1,329 14.0 704 441 26.2
1999 4,155 39.0 1,926 44.9 1,094 495 12.2
2000 5,146 23.9 1,958 1.7 937 540 9.1
2001 5,727 11.3 2,124 8.5 1,168 307 -43.1
2002 5,582 -2.5 2,230 5.0 1,267 391 27.4
2003 5,776 3.5 2,268 1.7 1,314 240 -38.6
2004 5,967 3.3 2,363 4.2 1,428 623 159.6
2005 6,385 7.0 2,496 5.6 1,375 654 5.0
2006 5,765 -9.7 2,237 -10.4 1,106 867 32.6
2007 6,148 6.6 2,357 5.4 1,234 742 -14.4
2008 6,721 9.3 2,480 5.2 1,167 576 -22.4
2009 6,785 0.9 2,502 0.9 975 684 18.7
Source : Consolidated Reports of Portugal Telecom, SGPS, S.A.
(1)
 The conversion rate used Euro/Escudo for the years 1997 and 1998 is the rate of 31/12/1998, 
(2)
 Included is the year 1997 as benchmark. Values ??calculated for the year 1997.
(3)
 Value calculated for the year 1998.
Table 2:  Portugal Telecom - Consolidated Results
1998 - 2009
      
in other words, 1 euro/200.482 escudos.
 
 
As shown in Table 2, we have also sustained growth in EBITDA during the 
period that goes from 1998 to 2009. Its annual growth was only negative in 
2006 that is, among other factors already referred to, the result of the negative 
impact of lower tariffs for fixed-mobile interconnection in the fixed network in 
Portugal. Along the series, the EBITDA performance is very similar to the 
behavior of Consolidated Operating Revenues of PT. Despite the difficult 
economic context of 2009, PT’s focus on international markets meant that 
51.5% of its revenues and 44% of its EBITDA were generated in this year by 
foreign assets. 
 
The Operating Results, i.e., results after amortization, also had a good 
performance (Table 2), considering the successive increases in amortization 
due to acquisitions and consolidations of VIVO, higher amortization rates for the 
oldest network communication in Brazil, as well as the resulting increase in the 
amortization due to commitments under the Information Society and 
investments in the subscription of television services, particularly in the last 





As far as respects the Consolidated Net Income between 1998 and 2009 a 
series of large swings can be noted in Table 2, when it comes to the results 
achieved during the period under review. However, we can also detect that 
there are two distinct periods: the first, despite the initial growth between 1998 
and 2000, as a result of Telesp Celular Participações, extends until 2003, the 
worst result of the series, only 240 million euros, which coincides with the 
consolidation of investments and the beginning of VIVO’s operations; the 
second, from 2004 to 2009, despite the large fluctuations is marked by a 
substantial increase in the level of the results achieved in comparison with the 
previous period. 
 
The significant drop in net income between 2001 and 2003, according to Table 
2, and the devaluation of 2002, is characteristic of a transition period with the 
announcement of the strategic agreement with Telefonica of Spain in view of 
the Brazilian mobile market in January 2001, passing through the acquisition of 
Tele Centro Oeste Participações SA - TCO, to the actual launching of VIVO in 
April 2003. Beyond an excellent range of 160% in 2004 in comparison to 2003, 
two years after the second period, between 2005 and 2006, a substantial 
growth of Net Income occurred, which led to an historic result of 867 million 
euros in 2006, the greatest of all time in PT. This second period ends with a 
slowdown in Net Income in the years of 2007 and 2008, but a recovery in 2009. 
This period is also characterized by huge economic difficulties in the domestic 
market, and seems to show the new level of returns to PT, around 700 million 
euros a year. In the Annual Report of PT (2009, p. 10) it was pointed out that 
international business represented 84% of clients, a significant part being from 
Brazil, with 51.5% of revenues and 43% of net income. 
 
 
4.3 The part of Brazil in the revenues by business segment, geographical 
area and clients 
One of our main objectives is to establish the most accurate relationship 
between the financial results of PT and its operations in Brazil. Chart 1 
concerning the structure of Consolidated Operating Revenues of PT in 2009, 
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shows its breakdown by business segment, highlighting the importance for PT 
of the participation in VIVO, which represented 46.3% of the total Group 
revenues. If we look at the Consolidated Operating Revenues by Geographical 
Area in 2009, the same phenomenon is also quite clear, since the revenues of 
VIVO and DEDIC, call center service of PT in Brazil, the values arising from the 
business in Brazil were almost equal to the operations in Portugal, with 
percentages of 48% and 49% respectively, with the item Other Assets and 
Eliminations making not more than 3%. 
 
  
     
Chart 1: Portugal Telecom - Structure of Consolidated 
Operating Revenues  - 2009 
Wireline
29%
Mobile Portugal  
TMN
22%







       Source: Consolidated Reports of Portugal Telecom, SGPS, S.A. 
 
 
At this point it is really important to note that the 2,990 million euros of 
Consolidated Operating Revenues of PT, obtained in 1998, the first year of our 
main series, the international market, including here Telesp Celular acquired in 
the second half of that year, accounted for only 205 million euros, representing 
6.9% of the total. These revenues however reflected the dynamism generated 
by the international investments with an increase of 91.3% over the previous 
year. Anyway, the weight of international operations in total revenues of PT was 
of 3.9% in 1997, and only 0.56% in 1993 (Ribeiro 2011, p. 46), what means that 




By the end of the period we have just studied, it must be once again 
emphasized the importance of investments in Brazil, and especially the 
potential of its growing consumer market, given the strong economic growth that 
the country has experienced in recent years, and despite the global financial 
and economic crisis of 2008/2009, as mentioned before. In these 
circumstances, Brazil had, and still has, a large potential to grow in the domain 
of telecommunication services, and PT had the possibility of obtaining large 
gains and of improving its financial situation, despite all the turbulence that 
accompanied this investment. 
 
                
        In millions
Year Portugal International Brazil/VIVO Total
Market customers
of PT
1998 6.4 2.1 - 8.5
1999 7.5 3.2 - 10.7
2000 8.8 4.6 - 13.4
2001 10.2 6.3 - 16.5
2002 11.1 17.2 16.9 28.4
2003 12.4 21.1 20.7 33.5
2004 11.6 26.5 26.5 38.1
2005 12.2 34.8 29.8 47.0
2006 12.6 37.4 29.0 50.0
2007 11.1 43.9 33.5 55.0
2008 11.2 58.7 44.9 70.0
2009 11.8 60.5 51.7 72.3
Source : Consolidated Reports of Portugal Telecom, SGPS, S.A.




Another important aspect concerns the number of its customers. In Table 3, we 
can seen the results of the internationalization process of PT between 1998 and 
2009, from this point of view. There is an increase in the number of customers 
in Portugal, almost doubling in 12 years, with PT continuing to strengthen its 
leadership in the domestic market, either by PT Comunicações fixed-line 
platforms or through TMN, which has more than 50% of mobile market; but 





On the contrary, in the international market the number of customers 
impressively grows 2,781%, in the period under review, i.e., from 2.1 in 1998 to 
60.5 million customers in 2009. Thus, it can be observed in Table 3, the strong 
annual growth of the number of customers in the international market, which at 
the end of 2009 represented the great majority of PT customers (83.7%). Within 
this total the part of Brazil with 51.7 million VIVO customers in 2009 was 
outstanding, representing 71.5% of the total of PT Group. So, after 
internationalization at large scale, begun in 1998, Brazil played a major role in 
the PT business from several perspectives. 
 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
The objective of this study is to analyze the performance of Portuguese 
investments in Brazil, through the experience of PT between 1998 and 2009, 
particularly as far as its financial results are concerned. Thus, in this conclusion, 
it will be first emphasized the main arguments that demonstrate the interface 
between the theoretical references and its implications for the 
internationalization process of PT. If we base our argument on Scott (1991, 
1992 and 2008), in the perspective of the technical dimension, which sets 
standards of rationality and efficiency as paradigmatic institutional mechanisms 
in business decisions. Thus, any analysis of investments and financial results of 
PT, stressing for example the effective participation of PT Group in VIVO, 
intends to identify the technical dimension, which relies on the economic 
efficiency of the company. 
 
In this perspective, three stages were found in the analysis of Financial 
Investment and the Tangible and Intangible Investments (CAPEX), components 
of Total Investment of PT in period from 1998 until 2009: the first involves the 
years of 1998 to 2001 and is characterized by the strong inflow of PT 
investments in Brazil; the second covers the years 2002 to 2007 and is 
differentiated by a slowdown of investments in Brazil, the accommodation level 
of CAPEX and the increase in shareholder remuneration of PT. Thus, there is 
after 2002 a clear orientation toward the reduction PT’s investments, with all the 
annual changes showing this downturn, both in financial investments and in 
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tangible and intangible assets (CAPEX); and the third stage includes the years 
2008 and 2009, and although it maintains the same features of the previous 
phase when it comes to investments of PT in Brazil and return to shareholders, 
it is distinguished by increased investment in the information society and R&D. 
 
As far as Operational Revenues are concerned, it is noticed that despite the 
negative changes on the years 2002 and 2006, there was a sustained growth in 
this item during the entire period. When examining more closely this indicator, it 
is shown that its development was basically divided into two phases: the first, 
covering the years 1998 and 2001, is easily recognized by a vertiginous growth 
(91.5%) of the revenue, therefore almost doubling the beginning of the process, 
reflecting the returns of the great investment PT in 1998; the second phase, 
from 2003 to 2009, after a small drop in revenues in 2002, is characterized by 
modest growth rates, albeit steady, despite all the adverse situation faced by 
the Portuguese economy during this period, including the uncertainties around 
the “hostile” takeover bid of SONAECOM, in the years 2006-2007. 
 
The international branch of PT had a significant weight on the results of the PT 
Group, and its importance is confirmed by the evolution of the share of 
international business in total revenues of the Group. Considering that in 2000 
the share of international revenues was 16%, and this contribution was 51.5% 
in 2009, where participation of Brazil is around 48%, i.e., the large majority of 
international revenues. The size and weight of international business in the PT 
Group are also significant regarding the total number of customers. PT reached 
in 2009, 72.3 million customers in the Portuguese, Brazilian, African and Asian 
markets, with the number of customers in the international market reaching 
83.7% of the total of PT, and the 51.7 million VIVO customers in Brazil 
represented 71.8% of that total. 
 
The internationalization of PT in Brazil ran within very difficult and changing 
conditions, initially alone and with some opposition in Portugal, then allied with 
Telefónica in VIVO, between 2003 and 2010, together with the prolonged 
effects of the takeover bid launched by SONAECOM in February 2006 in a 
process that lasted more than one year, in the middle of great uncertainties with 
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regard to the permanence of PT in Brazil. All these and other disturbing factors 
were associated with frequent changes of administration and governments in 
Portugal, with a typical shareholder remuneration policy of private enterprise in 
the distribution of shares, but with a very delicate position of the Portuguese 
government through the 500 shares Class A, the so-called "Golden Shares", 
and finally the sale of VIVO to Telefónica in 2010 and the entry into a strategic 
partnership with Oi in 2011. Despite this extremely complex institutional 
framework and vicissitudes, the PT has achieved good financial results in the 
entire period, especially based on the contribution of Brazil, when in late 1990s, 
before its internationalization process at a large scale, the contribution from 





AMITRANO, Cláudio (2010). O Regime de Crescimento Econômico Brasileiro: 
uma apreciação sobre o período 1995-2009. In: Brasil em desenvolvimento 
2010: estado, planejamento e políticas públicas. IPEA, Brasília. Accessible 
in: http://www.ipea.gov.br. Access in 02/05/2011. 
CHARLTON, Andrew, Hans CRISTIANSE, and Charles OMAN (2003). 
Incentives-based Competition for Foreign Direct Investment: the case of 
Brazil. OECD Working Papers on International Investment, OECD, Paris. 
Doi: 10.1787/631632456403. Accessible in: http://www.oecd.org. Access in 
06/10/2005. 
FONSECA, Manoel Justiniano Melo da, Joaquim Ramos SILVA, Ana Maria 
Ferreira MENEZES (2009). “The internationalization of Portugal Telecom 
and its impact on the company’s organizational structure”, International 
Journal of Engineering and Industrial Management, Vol. 1, nº 1, pp. 209-230. 
FONSECA, Manoel Justiniano Melo da; Joaquim Ramos SILVA (2011). O Caso 
Portugal Telecom no Contexto das Relações entre o Brasil e Portugal: a 
perspectiva da sua internacionalização. Paper presented at XI Congresso 
Internacional Luso-Afro Brasileiro (CONLAB) de Ciências Sociais, Salvador. 
IBGE. Accessible in: http://www.ibge.gov.br. Access in julho de 2010. 
26 
 
ICEP (2005). Os Investimentos Portugueses no Brasil, ICEP- Delegação de 
São Paulo, São Paulo. 
JÚLIO, Paulo and Ricardo Pinheiro ALVES (2011). The Internationalization of 
the Portuguese Economy, Working Paper, BMEP nº 8, GEE/GPEARI, 
Lisbon. 
MATEUS, Abel (2006). A Economia Portuguesa, 3rd edition (revised and 
augmented), Ed. Verbo, Lisboa. 
MOTTA, Paulo Roberto (2001). Gestão Contemporânea: a ciência e a arte de 
ser dirigente. 12th  edition. Rio de Janeiro: Record. 
PENROSE, Edith (1959, 2006). A Teoria do Crescimento da Firma. Portuguese 
version. Ed. Unicamp, São Paulo, Campinas. 
PORTUGAL TELECOM (1997 a 2009). Relatório e Contas Consolidadas. 
Accessible in: http://www.portugaltelecom.pt. Access from 17/07/2007 to 
20/06/2010. 
SCOTT, W. R. (1991). Unpacking institutional arguments. In: POWELL, W. W e 
DIMAGGIO, P. (Eds.). The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis. 
Chicago: Chicago University Press. 
SCOTT, W. R. (1992). The organization of environments: network, cultural and 
historical elements. In: MEYER, J. W. e SCOTT, W. R. Organizational 
environments: ritual and rationality. London: Sage Publications.  
SCOTT, W. R. (2008). Institutions and organizations: ideas and interests. 
United States: Sage Publications, 280 p. 
SILVA, Joaquim Ramos. (2002). Portugal/Brasil: uma década de expansão das 
relações económicas, 1992-2002. Lisboa: Terramar. 
SILVA, Joaquim Ramos (2003). “Significado e Perspectivas do Reencontro 
Económico entre Brasil e Portugal”. BAHIA ANÁLISE E DADOS, Salvador, 
v. 13, nº 1, pp. 23-29. 
SILVA, Joaquim Ramos (2005). “A internacionalização das empresas 
portuguesas: a experiência brasileira”, RAE – Revista de Administração de 
Empresas, Volume 45, Special Edition Minas Gerais, pp. 102-115. 
SILVA, Joaquim Ramos (2006). O investimento directo estrangeiro. In António 
Romão, Org., A Economia Portuguesa 20 Anos após a Adesão, Chapter 12, 
Ed. Almedina, Coimbra, pp. 491-518. 
27 
 
SILVA, Joaquim Ramos (2008). Internationalization Strategies in Iberoamerica: 
the case of Portuguese trade. Economic Commission for Latin America and 
the Caribbean (ECLAC) – Project Documents collection, United Nations 
Publications, Santiago de Chile. 
TEIXEIRA, Maria Eunice R. M. (2011). A Estratégia de Internacionalização da 
Portugal Telecom em Perspectiva Comparada. Master Dissertation, ISEG, 
Lisbon. 
TORAL, Pablo (2006). Latin America’s Quest for Globalization. The Role of 
Spanish Firms, paper prepared to the Presentation at the Quinn Dickerson 
Seminar Series, November 8, Suffolk: Suffolk University. 
